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Abstract 
Purpose: The study attempts to analyze the impact of economic 
and non-economic factors on the Turkish economy which was 
plunged plunged into a currency crisis in August 2018 due in 
most part to sanctions and tariffs imposed by the U.S. 
Design and Methodology: Turkey’s economy is characterized 
as one with high inflation and persistent chronic deficits. The 
study was based on a literature review of the adverse impact of 
America’s weaponizing dollar and abuse of sanction power on 
Turkish economy. The study analyzes developments that laid 
the foundation for the collapse of Turkey’s a decade-long credit-
fueled economy. The broad analysis of Turkey’s most severe 
currency shock since the unprecedented 2001 economic crisis 
looks at various exogeneous and endogenous aspects.  
Findings: The study shows that Turkish economy possesses 
instability-inflicting imbalances such as high inflation, growing 
budget deficit, massive dollarization, alarming levels of external 
debt, and chronic current account deficit. The study concludes 
that the causes of Turkey’s gloomy economic situation are not 
all homegrown, its lackluster performance is blamed on attacks 
of non-economic basis. Another key finding is that Turkey is in 
desperate need of foreign capital flows as Turkey’s options to 
service its massive esternal debt through foreign barrowing 
have become substantially limited since the 2018 August rout.  
Practical Implications: In general terms, interest rates are of 
great importance as a monetary policy tool, but in Turkey, the 
relationship between the U.S. and Turkey sometimes plays a 
more pivotal role in determining the interest rate elevation and 
the consequent spike in inflation. The article offers insights to 
government authorities who should commit to structural and 
fiscal reforms to put the economy back on the right track for a 
faster recovery, or else let it collapse beyond repair.   
Originality/Value: The conclusions and findings in this study 
impact the perspective of the Turkish central bank with regard 
to policy responses under economic and financial distress that 
may arise from economic, non-economic, political and non-
political driving and contributing factors. Because of premature 
and late responses, Turkish citizens are a lot poorer now than 
they were prior to the August rout in 2018. 
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2019.37 
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1.0 Introduction 
Turkey's near meltdown economy, a casualty of speculative attacks on Turkish lira in August 2018 
and the subsequent unfolding events, is forecast to contract in 2019 after a decade-long credit-fueled 
boom. The Fed’s historically low interest rates due to its expansive monetary policies in the aftermath 
of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) were a trap luring Turkish banks to borrow cheap greenbacks 
(i.e. dollar glut) which were lent back domestically to private businesses who now agonizingly face 
the amplified dollar dilemma because their substantially devalued cash flows are in lira while their 
foreign debt is mostly dollar (and euro) denominated (see Figure 1). According to the Turkish central 
bank (TCMB), Turkey’s hemorrhaged gross external debt has alarmingly exceeded $400 billion at the 
end of 2017 and people fear that things may get a lot worse (double-dip recession) before recovery. 
Many economists forecast further contraction in the broader economic activity in 2020; a wide 
ranging estimates show that Turkey’s fragile economy may contract between 1% and 5% in 2020.           
 
 
Source: TCMB – Turkish Republic Central Bank 
https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Statistics/Chart+Gallery 
Figure 1: Outstanding Loans Received From Abroad By Private Sector (Billion $)   
Although the August rout of 2018, the biggest currency shock since the 2001 Turkish economic crisis, 
could toss Turkey back in a high inflationary mode; Turkish government authorities have dismissed 
the recent severe economic trouble and blamed the crisis on dysfunctional and hostile policies of non-
economic basis. For the past four decades, Turkey’s economy has been characterized as one with high 
inflation and persistent chronic of current account deficit (for a fuller discussion, see Altug et al., 2008; 
Aricanli & Rodrik, 1990; Eken & Schadler, 2012); nevertheless, Turkey’s present gloomy economic 
situation is far more improved than that of the late 1960s during which the average exchange rate of 
USD/TRY was about nine lira per dollar (see Boratav, 2009; Boratav & Yeldan, 2001).     
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The new millennium has not only brought the biggest currency shock and the resultant economic 
collapse in Turkey’s history, but also instigated a fresh start in Turkey’s unstable political arena. The 
financial dismay of 2001 crisis greatly benefited the Justice and Development Party (AKP) which was 
formed in August 2001 shortly after the collapse of the triad coalition led by Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit. After winning 363 parliamentary seats in the November 2002 elections1, the leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan became prime minister in March 2003 of a non-coalition2 government; he wanted to 
remove the national infamy of chronic inflation and repeated military coups for good (Önis & Aysan, 
2000; Özatay & Sak, 2002; Yeldan, 2001). In the face of Turkey’s huge progress of fiscal and structural 
reforms since 2002, its economic growth (stable exchange rates) has been costly and crisis-ridden.3 
 
Table 1: History of the IMF’s Lending Arrangements with Turkey 
In Thousands of SDR 
No Facility 
Date of  
Arrangement 
Expiration 
Date 
Amount  
Agreed 
Amount  
Drawn 
Amount  
Outstanding 
19 Standby Arrangement    May 11, 2005    May 10, 2008 6,662,040 4,413,602 4,066,620 
18 Standby Arrangement    Feb 04, 2002    Feb 03, 2005 12,821,200 11,914,000 155,925 
17 Standby Arrangement 
Supplemental Reserve 
   Dec 22, 1999  
  Dec 21, 2000 
   Feb 04, 2002  
  Dec 20, 2001 
15,038,400 
5,784,000 
11,738,960 
5,784,000 
0 
0 
16 Standby Arrangement    Jul 08, 1994    Mar 07, 1996 610,500 460,500 0 
15 Standby Arrangement    Apr 04, 1984    Apr 03, 1985 225,000 168,750 0 
14 Standby Arrangement    Jun 24, 1983    Apr 03, 1984 225,000 56,250 0 
13 Standby Arrangement    Jun 18, 1980    Jun 17, 1983 1,250,000 1,250,000 0 
12 Standby Arrangement    Jul 19, 1979    Jun 17, 1980 250,000 230,000 0 
11 Standby Arrangement    Apr 24, 1978    Jul 18, 1979 300,000 90,000 0 
10 Standby Arrangement    Aug 17, 1970    Aug 16, 1971 90,000 90,000 0 
9 Standby Arrangement    Jul 01, 1969    Jun 30, 1970 27,000 10,000 0 
8 Standby Arrangement    Apr 01, 1968    Dec 31, 1968 27,000 27,000 0 
7 Standby Arrangement    Feb 15, 1967    Dec 31, 1967 27,000 27,000 0 
6 Standby Arrangement    Feb 01, 1966    Dec 31, 1966 21,500 21,500 0 
5 Standby Arrangement    Feb 01, 1965    Dec 31, 1965 21,500 0 0 
4 Standby Arrangement    Feb 15, 1964    Dec 31, 1964 21,500 19,000 0 
3 Standby Arrangement    Feb 15, 1963    Dec 31, 1963 21,500 21,500 0 
2 Standby Arrangement    Mar 30, 1962    Dec 31, 1962 31,000 15,000 0 
1 Standby Arrangement    Jan 01, 1961    Dec 31, 1961 37,500 16,000 0 
Source: IMF, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/extarr2.aspx?memberKey1=980&date1key=2008-03-31 
After 19 standby agreements and more than $40 billion in short-term loans (Table 1), privatization4 
of the state-owned entities since the 1980s and capital market liberalization in the 1990s have been 
                                                          
1 Only two parties managed to pass the 10% threshold to enter the parliament (this was a second time occurrence since 
1961); AKP got 34.3% of votes and the Republican People's Party (CHP) got 19.38% of votes and 178 seats. 
2 From 1950 to 2019, there have been four single-party governments; Democratic Party (1950-1960), Justice Party (1965-
1971), Motherland Party (1983-1991), Justice and Development Party (2002-present). There were coalition governments 
in-between; four governments (1973-1980) and seven governments during 1991-2002.   
3 Economic boom in the 1950s was interrupted by the 1960 military coup; the growth was reasonably moderate in the 
1960s; export boom and resultant good growth in the 1980s; good growth and single digit inflation (2017) during AKP.   
4 The US President Ronald Reagan and the UK’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made privatization become a household 
name; their eternal legacies and unique approaches have been referred to as “Reaganomics” and “Thatcherism”.   
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rather bad for Turkey, therefore the 2001 economic crisis was inevitable. Furthermore, the seeds of 
Turkey’s current economic problems had been planted by the last three bailout packages prior to and 
in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis (Önis, 2009; Raina & Bakker, 2003). After the AKP’s win in the 2007 
parliamentary elections (47% of seats), Prime Minister Erdoğan had said “No IMF in Turkey’s future”5 
(Eken & Schadler, 2012); accordingly, Turkey made its last payment of the outstanding balance from 
the 19th standby agreement to the IMF in May 2008. Many contend that Turkey’s divorce from the 
IMF can hardly qualify as a graduation since the country is on the brink of a financial collapse.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Exchange Rates Before The August Rout 
 
USD/TYR USD/EUR USD/GBP USD/CHF USD/JPY USD/AUD USD/ARS USD/BRL 
Mean 2.3875 0.8020 0.6667 0.9603 99.7977 1.1545 8.9984 2.5261 
Standard Error 0.0148 0.0014 0.0011 0.0010 0.2493 0.0027 0.1001 0.0130 
Median 2.0954 0.7802 0.6443 0.9619 101.8403 1.1203 6.8020 2.2669 
Mode 1.5800 0.7350 0.6222 0.9650 120.2650 0.9797 3.8450 1.7720 
Standard Deviation 0.8443 0.0780 0.0610 0.0577 14.2647 0.1533 5.7265 0.7453 
Sample Variance 0.7128 0.0061 0.0037 0.0033 203.4813 0.0235 32.7923 0.5554 
Kurtosis -0.3259 -1.1586 -0.1775 1.3019 -1.2413 -1.4245 0.3832 -1.2667 
Skewness 0.8410 0.3061 1.0013 0.1321 -0.1099 0.1080 1.0864 0.4136 
Range 3.4867 0.3019 0.2470 0.4342 49.8890 0.5510 25.1986 2.6082 
Minimum 1.3960 0.6625 0.5827 0.7278 75.7460 0.9070 3.7852 1.5324 
Maximum 4.8827 0.9644 0.8297 1.1620 125.6350 1.4580 28.9838 4.1406 
Count 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 
         
 
USD/RUB USD/CNY USD/IDR USD/MYR USD/PHP USD/SGD USD/THB USD/ZAR 
Mean 44.0429 6.4623 11288 3.5417 45.6950 1.3215 32.5101 10.4836 
Standard Error 0.2688 0.0045 34.6269 0.0084 0.0554 0.0012 0.0318 0.0476 
Median 34.1942 6.3922 11537 3.3100 44.8275 1.3233 32.3808 10.4598 
Mode 30.1000 6.8270 13320 4.2650 43.3000 1.3978 32.6300 7.7618 
Standard Deviation 15.3819 0.2602 1981 0.4834 3.1677 0.0662 1.8193 2.7209 
Sample Variance 236.6026 0.0677 3925601 0.2337 10.0343 0.0044 3.3100 7.4033 
Kurtosis -1.4511 0.3852 -1.6142 -1.2287 -0.4648 -1.3117 -0.8394 -1.2412 
Skewness 0.4767 0.0600 -0.0085 0.5712 0.6213 0.0731 0.3038 0.2316 
Range 56.9088 2.7585 10268 1.5683 13.1130 0.2512 8.1070 10.2912 
Minimum 27.1722 4.2025 4497 2.9289 40.5500 1.2011 28.3900 6.5680 
Maximum 84.0810 6.9610 14765 4.4972 53.6630 1.4523 36.4970 16.8592 
Count 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 3274 
Source of data: Oz Forex; https://www.ofx.com/en-us/forex-news/historical-exchange-rates/ 
Notwithstanding the IMF’s repeated failures on account of its policy errors in tandem with politically 
influenced objectives, it would be fair to conclude that the IMF’s last three stabilization programs with 
Turkey involving IMF’s strings-attached lending (i.e. fiscal and structural reforms) were successful in 
stabilizing exchange rates (see Table 2) and reducing consumer price index – CPI (inflation). In 2005 
                                                          
5 Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-imf-in-turkeys-future-erdogan-141401 
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after removing six zeros from the old lira, the average exchange rate of USD/TRY was 1.3440; despite 
the outbreak of the GFC of 2008, lira appreciated against the dollar (1.3020). Between 2005 and 2010, 
Turkish lira barely lost value against the dollar (1.4050, a depreciation of circa 5%). In stark contrast 
to a mix of fear and speculation, Turkey managed to escape the adverse effects of the GFC with a minor 
dent in its economy. Regardless, Turkey is in constant need of capital inflows in order to service its 
foreign denominated debt obligations and finance government-supported infrastructure projects to 
leap into the next higher level of economic performance to catch up with the advanced nations. 
Turkey had milestone achievements in the 1990s; as such, a customs union agreement6 between the 
European Union (EU) and Turkey was signed on 31 December 1995 in accordance to the decision 
taken by EC-Turkey Association Council on 6 March 1995; and in 1996, the Customs Union enabled 
the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) allowing free flow of goods between Turkey and the EU 
without any customs restrictions (i.e. agricultural products were covered by the Association Council’s 
1998 decision). Another landmark decision came in December 1999 at the Helsinki summit (delayed 
twice due to the fall of the Soviet Union and German reunification), Turkey’s candidacy to join the EU 
became official.7 At the backdrop of the EU related developments and domestic events8, a report (end-
2004) by the European Commission indicated that Turkey complied with the Copenhagen political 
criteria and Turkey’s accession negotiations began on 3 October 2005. Unfortunately, negotiations 
were halted in 2007 as Cyprus used its veto power to boycott the opening up new chapters.  
The economic crisis of 2001, inevitable contagion of contemporaneous crises throughout the 1990s 
(for Asian crisis’ contagion, see Baig & Goldfajn, 1999), was a wake-up call for the Turkish government 
and its regulatory body of banking and supervision (abbreviated as BDDK in Turkish). Following the 
2001 crisis, financial authorities finally understood the critical importance of painstaking fiscal and 
monetary policy decisions that manifestly contributed to stability; as a result, government debt ratios 
declined substantially and inflation was tamed during 2005-07 and 2012-17 (average CPI of 5-6%). 
A stable macroeconomic environment resulting from higher growth, profitable banks, and improved 
FSIs alleviated risks and this resulted in positive country ratings. These factors and more have made 
Turkey’s image shine at home and abroad, triggering a surge in FDIs and FPIs9 (IMF, 2007). 
                                                          
6 Although the Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU was signed in December 1995, the process actually 
began more than half a century ago with signing of the Ankara Agreement in 1963 to abolish tariffs and quotas.. 
7 In 1963, Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement (EEC-Turkey Association Agreement) and became an associate member of 
the EU in the following year (1964), More than two decades later, Turkey applied for full membership on 14 April 1987. 
8 1999 was the darkest year, earthquakes in August and November at the magnitude of at least 7.2 claimed more than twenty 
thousand lives and cost billions of dollars. Just as Turkish people were trying to deal with tremendous pain and suffering, 
they were hit by an economic crisis which was the biggest financial shock in Turkey’s history. The farfetched implications 
of two crises, natural and financial, took an unbearable toll on the citizens of Turkey. Directly related or not,   
9 FSI: Financial soundness indicators; FDI: Foreign direct investment; FPI: Foreign portfolio investment (stocks and bonds). 
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2.0 Literature Review 
Turkish economy has encountered numerous economic and financial shocks10, three of which turned 
into high-magnitude crises and the fourth potential economic crisis is in the works since the August 
rout of 2018, but virtually all of them were somewhat related to the first external borrowing took 
place by the Ottoman Empire11 in the mid-19th century before it was succeeded by the new Republic 
of Turkey12 (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003; Celasun, 1998; Ertuğrul & Selçuk, 2001; Kibritçioğlu, 2001). Once 
militarily superb and financially resilient Ottoman Empire – for the first time since its establishment 
in 1299 – was forced to borrow consequent of its fatal decision to participate in the costly Crimean 
War (1853-56), this also marked the beginning of the ailing Empire’s everlasting addiction to foreign 
barrowing (Inalcik & Quataert, 1995; Caillard, 1894). Over a century later, Turkey’s gloomy economic 
situation13 attests that not a thing has changed; then, the Ottoman Empire was besieged by loans from 
Britain and France that put a leash on its economy forcing Sultan Abdülhamid II to create the Ottoman 
Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881 in order to administer war reparations and the Empire’s 
debt (Blaisdell, 1929; also see Birdal, 2010 for striking similarities between OPDA and the IMF). 
As Keynes (1919; 1936) advocated the necessity of government intervention during a depression like 
crisis; in the early days of the war-devastated Turkish Republic (1923-38), Atatürk realized that any 
type of a factory to produce goods had to be built by the government due to a lack of skilled labor, raw 
materials, private capital, and potential investors. Therefore, this was the start of an era in which any 
sort of production in Turkey was done by the state-owned enterprises (see Boratav, 2009; Nas, 2008). 
Bredenkamp et al. (2009) argue that the Turkish economy ensuing severe financial or economic crises 
tends to follow an inward-looking growth strategy characterized by rigorous regulation, protection 
from foreign rivalry, and increasing state ownership in commercial activity. Without an exception, a 
crisis in Turkey is fostered by a credit-fueled boom that turns ordinary folks into avid buyers; this in 
turn creates large deficits and substantially increases debt levels of households and private firms.   
                                                          
10 For further readings, see Taskinsoy (2008; 2012a, b, c; 2013a, b; 2019 a, b, c, d).  
11 For longer discussion and historical perspective on the Ottoman Empire’s public debt, see Caillard (1894), Eldem (2005), 
Owen (1987), Urquhart (1833), Fişek (1968), Genç (1987), Issawi (1966), and Goodhart (1972). 
12 Mustafa Kemal’s well-organized resistance army was victorious in the Turkish War of Independence, which expelled the 
occupying armies; subsequently, Mustafa Kemal abolished the Ottoman Empire in 1922 by overthrowing Sultan Mehmet 
VI Vahdettin and established the Turkish Republic in 1923. Ataturk was elected as the President in 1923 and the Grand 
National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) honored him with the title Atatürk in 1934 which means “Father of the Turks”.  
13 Although at times the Turkish economy has enjoyed low inflation and a more manageable deficits of current account and 
government budget, it is still highly vulnerable to endogenous and exogenous shocks due to its extremely high reliance 
on external borrowing to service its debt obligations that come due in the short-term and in the long-run. Another big 
reason why Turkey’s economy is susceptible to shocks is the fact that the country has always lagged behind compared to 
peers in terms of adopting and implementing international banking standards (see Taskinsoy, 2013a, b; 2018 a, b, c; 2019 
e, f, g, h). Due to the United States’ repeated abuse of sanction power and its use of dollar as a weapon of economic 
destruction, Turkey (also China and Russia) has been trying to accumulate gold to reduce its elongated addiction on the 
U.S. dollar (for a fuller discussion on alternatives to dollar, see Taskinsoy 2018d; 2019i, j, k).     
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The homegrown invents in the late 1950s as well as at the onset of the 1960s (i.e. devaluation of lira 
in August 1958, military coup in May 1960, a standby agreement with the IMF in January 1961, and 
the execution of its Prime Minister Adnan Menderes by hanging in September 1961) set the stage for 
Turkey’s inevitable balance of payments and debt crisis in 1977-79, which was also contributed by 
macro events that triggered the oil crisis in the same decade (for a perspective on Adnan Menderes 
and his Democratic Party, see Akın, 2002; Albayrak, 2004; Armaoğlu, 1994; Aydemir, 2013).    
 
 
Source: World Bank; http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/ 
Figure 2: Gross Domestic Product and GDP Per Capita 
GDP ($billion): 14.0 (1960), 17.09 (1970), 68.79 (1980), 150.7 (1990), 130.7 (1994), 273.0 (2000), 
200.3 (2001), 764.3 (2008), 950.6 (2013), 851.1 (2017), and below 800 billion in 2019. 
GDP Per Capita ($USD): 509.42 (1960), 489.93 (1970), 1,564.25 (1980), 2,794.35 (1990), 2,270.34 
(1994), 4,316.55 (2000), 3,119.60 (2001), 10,850.87 (2008), 12,542.72 (2013), 10.540.62 (2017).   
The decade of the 1960s in many aspects was challenging, increasing instability was apparent in every 
facet of life; consequently, GDP growth was low attributable to high inflation (circa 16% in 1959-60) 
and large current account deficit (Dibooğlu & Kibritçioğlu, 2001; Domaç, 2003). In 1960, the GDP of 
$14 billion is only 1.6% of the 2017 GDP of $851 billion and the GDP per capita of $509 is less than 
5% of $10,541 in 2017. In addition to augmented political turmoil and social unrest, the devaluation 
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of lira in August 1958 caused a spike on inflation and a surge in dollarization that in turn resulted in 
a contraction in the broader economy. While Turkey was muddling with extreme problems at home, 
the IMF was waiting anxiously on the sideline to put a leash on the Turkish economy via its strings-
attached bailout loans; due to the mounting political and financial pressure, Turkey gave in and signed 
its first standby agreement with the IMF in January 1961. Turkey expanded its GDP in the 1970s 
compared with the previous decade, the GDP per capita fell by about 4%, from $509 in 1960 to $490 
in 1970 (see Dibooğlu and Kibritçioğlu, 2004; Karacal & Bahmani-Oskooee, 2008; Pongsaparn, 2002).  
The decade of the 1980s – coined as a “lost decade”14 – began in Turkey with the inheritance of great 
inflation from the 1970s plus another military coup in 1980; extreme negative effects of the oil crisis15 
and a reversal in capital flows led to a severe balance of payment and currency crises in Turkey in the 
late 1970s. As part of the standby agreements (11, 12, and 13) during 1978-80, the IMF’s prerequisite 
of financial and trade liberalization (i.e. opening-up domestic capital markets to foreign competition) 
had produced more instability than stability in Turkey in the long-run (see Furman & Stiglitz, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2004; Rodrik, 2001). Most academic experts, including Rogoff and Prasad (2003), Stiglitz 
(2004), Howitt and McAfee (1992) support the World Bank’s econometric evidence that capital 
market liberalization inflicts instability, however the IMF has neither acknowledged nor refuted the 
evidence (for fuller discussion, see Stiglitz, 2004).16 Increased capital inflows in the form of FDIs and 
FPIs is a common feature of capital-market liberalization, but the downside is that financial 
integration may make some developing and emerging market economies more prone to crises.   
As the 1980s was a “lost decade” for many countries in Latin America (i.e. unable to service foreign 
debt, suspend payments or unilaterally declare a debt moratorium), the 1990s had qualified as a lost 
decade for Turkey as its economy was in deep recession by the mid-1990s ensuing the 1994 economic 
crisis (Aricanli & Rodrik, 1990; Boratav & Yeldan, 2001; Celasun, 1989; Ekinci, 1990). Mody and 
Schindler (2005) argue that the growth during Özal administration responded strongly to the capital 
                                                          
14 In the 1960s and 1970s, some countries in Latin America, namely Brazil, Argentina and Mexico incurred far more foreign 
debt than their ability to repay them back (principle plus interest). In just several years, the debt stock of Latin America 
exceeded from $75 billion in 1975 to over $300 billion in 1983. 
15 The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) sharply raised the oil prices as a retaliation to the U.S. for 
its aid to Israel during the Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent Yom Kippur War in 1973. The price of oil skyrocketed 
from circa $3/barrel in 1969 to $12/barrel in early 1974. For economic effects of the 1973-79 oil crisis, see Burbidge and 
Harrison (1984); Finn (2000); Blanchard & Gali (2010); Skeet (1988); Leduc & Sill (2004).  
16 Under neoclassical economics, assuming perfect information, perfect capital markets, and perfect competition exist, 
capital market liberalization should lead to growth and reduced volatility; however, it should also be noted that there is 
asymmetry of information, imperfect capital markets with frictions, and competition is far from perfect (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 
2000). Procyclicality, arbitrage, high volatility in exchange rates, and beggar-thy-neighbor policies are other issues (Lewis, 
1995). The biggest negative effect of capital market liberalization is that it reduces the government’s ability and capacity 
to adequately respond to macroeconomic shocks. The IMF’s capital market liberalization has made Turkey more prone to 
economic and financial crises because Turkey greatly lacks of transparency (i.e. imperfect information).        
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market and trade liberalization, however the anticipated positive impact of the fiscal and structural 
reforms17 was undermined by a poor financial discipline by the government. The perceived success 
of Özal’s economic programs were overshadowed by the growing current account deficit bubble and 
staggering foreign debt. Additionally, Rijckeghem and Üçer (2005) argue that rising political turmoil, 
growing concerns about bank soundness, and worsening economic indicators created a perfect storm 
that subverted market confidence. Rawdanowicz (2010) points out that financial or economic crises 
in Turkey are usually the end result of Turkey’s chronic current account and budget deficits. 
 
Table 3: Turkey’s GDP, GDP Per Capita, and Budget Deficit (2000-2018)  
Year 
Annual GDP 
$million 
Annual GDP 
Growth % 
GDP Per 
Capita $ 
Per Capita 
Growth % 
Budget Deficit 
$million 
Budget 
Deficit % 
2018 766,428 2.6 9,346 -11.3 -14,800 -1.90 
2017 851,521 7.4 10.537 -2.6 -19,946 -2.34 
2016 863,390 3.2 10,817 -0.9 -20,107 -2.33 
2015 859,449 6.1 10,915 -9.2 -10,872 -1.27 
2014 934,075 5.2 12,022 -3.0 -13,353 -1.43 
2013 950,328 8.5 12,395 7.3 -13,963 -1.47 
2012 873,696 4.8 11,553 3.7 -15,988 -1.83 
2011 832,497 11.1 11,141 6.4 -5,720 -0.74 
2010 772,290 8.5 10,476 17.9 -19,042 -2.68 
2009 644,470 -4.9 8,882 -16.9 -42,821 -6.17 
2008 764,643 0.8 10,692 11.8 -20,466 -2.80 
2007 675,010 5.0 9,563 21.1 -9,860 -1.50 
2006 550,796 7.1 7,899 8.5 3,950 0.80 
2005 501,163 9.0 7,278 22.3 -5,648 -1.20 
2004 404,853 9.6 5,953 28.2 -17,393 -4.40 
2003 311,944 5.6 4,543 29.4 -27,197 -9.00 
2002 238,342 6.4 3,589 17.6 -23,477 -10.20 
2001 200,305 -5.8 3,053 -27.6 -46,705 -23.90 
2000 273,085 6.6 4,219 5.0 -18,265 -6.80 
1994 179.208 -5.1 3,024 -29.0 -26,860 -10.00 
       
Source: https://countryeconomy.com/deficit/turkey 
Capital-market liberalization as the IMF policy required for bailout loans combined with large deficits 
of current account and government budget as well as lira’s devaluation led to the 1994 economic 
crisis (Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Feldstein, 1998; Rodrik, 1997; Stiglitz, 1997). In each of Turkey’s 
three high-magnitude crises, the GDP declined 5% or more (see Table 3) and lira plummeted in excess 
of 50% against the dollar; circa 60% in 1994, 70% in 2001, and 50% in 2009. At the backdrop of 
deteriorated economic indicators (a recipe for currency crises, i.e. Kaminsky et al., 1998), inflation “a 
monetary phenomenon” (Friedman, 1970) skyrocketed in 1994 (125%) and 2001 (70%), but tamed 
during 2008-09 (circa 10%). Egeli (1999) argues that crisis-inflicting aspect of budget deficit is more 
                                                          
17 Turgut Özal, as the Prime Minister in 1983 after the military coup ended in 1982, was the main architect behind 
transforming the Turkish economy from import-focused to export-focused through privatization. Reforms included 
developing sound monetary policies, encouraging FDIs, reducing subsidies, and discouraging price controls. 
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apparent in developing and emerging market economies than advanced nations (Peker & Acar, 2010), 
Şen et al (2007) believe that geopolitical alignments and military risks could tick inflation upward. 
Under the helm of the IMF, macroeconomic policy adjustments were main concern of tackle in Turkey 
during and after the 2001 crisis; enormously challenging task was to prevent falling asset prices and 
try to keep inflation tamed; moreover, fiscal policy (Friedman, 1948) was reserved to provide limited 
support for capital outflows and to finance, if needed, any bank re-structuring or assuming private 
debt of ailing insolvent banks (Gros & Selçuki, 2013). These essential reforms could be seen as the 
first phase in the long recovery process (Quinn, 2003), nevertheless they need be taken immediately 
to restore the investor confidence and at the same time allow a sustainable growth to resume without 
any speculation or doubt of its resilience (Bredenkamp et al., 2009). Risks were still tilted to the 
downside as Turkey’s protracted bid for its accession to the EU was blocked by Cyprus in December 
2009 plus then the Prime Minister Erdoğan had blamed the IMF and its policies for Turkey’s economic 
problems and said “No IMF in Turkey’s future”18 and “the IMF chapter will not be reopened”19. 
The repeated speculative attacks on lira in August 2018 were unprecedented and the ensuing massive 
damage on the Turkish economy has been far greater than that of Turkey’s antecedent crises (1994, 
2001, and 2009). The value of lira against dollar plummeted, the fastest drop in the history of lira; in 
a matter of just several months, lira depreciated20 from 3.78 in January 2018 to intraday high of 7.24 
in August 2018 (as of 2 August 2019, USD/TRY is 5.60), this was the biggest currency shock since the 
2001 economic crisis (Taskinsoy, 2019b; c; d). As illustrated in Figure 3 (A to F), consumer price index 
(A) peaked at 25.24% in October 2018 (highest in a decade), which in fact doubled from August 2017 
level. Producer price index (B) saw the largest spike; from 2-3% in October 2016, it almost hit 50%. 
Dollarization persists very strong (C), $185 billion in April 2019 but reached as high as $210 billion 
(dollarization is expected to lose steam after the TCMB lowered the fund rate by 425 basis points on 
July 25, 2019). International investment position (D) dropped significantly after August 2018, which 
saw further decline after President Erdoğan sacked the TCMB governor. Short-term external debt on 
a maturity basis (E) is little over $175 billion ($75 billion of debt matures in 2019). Interest rates for 
bank loans and deposits (F) are still very high, this situation has been a huge strain on the economy; 
peaked at around 26%; currently, approximately 22% for deposits and 30% for commercial loans. 
                                                          
18 Hurriyet Daily News, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-imf-in-turkeys-future-erdogan-141401 
19 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/imf-chapter-will-not-be-reopened-says-erdogan-141029. 
20 Turkish lira depreciated about 100% against dollar in 10 years, whereas lira recently lost more than 80% of its value in a 
matter of just two weeks in mid-August 2018. April 10, 2005 (1.35), April 10, 2006 (1.35), April 10, 2007 (1.37), April 10, 
2008 (1.29), April 10, 2009 (1.57), April 10, 2010 (1.49), April 10, 2011 (1.52), April 10, 2012 (1.79), April 10, 2013 (1.79), 
April 10, 2014 (2.10), April 10, 2015 (2.62), April 10, 2016 (2.85), April 10, 2017 (3.73), January 2, 2018 (3.76), August 
13, 2018 (6.91, intraday high of 7.24), December 31, 2018 (5.28), February 13, 2018 (5.27). 
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A. Consumer Price Index (CPI) – Annual Change (%) B. Producer Price Index (PPI) – Annual Change (%) 
  
C. Resident’s FX Deposits with Banks (Billion $) D. International Investment Position (Billion $) 
  
E. Short-Term External Debt Statistics (Billion $)   F. Interest Rates for Banks’ Loans and Deposits (%) 
Source: TCMB – Turkish Republic Central Bank 
https://www.tcmb.gov.tr/wps/wcm/connect/EN/TCMB+EN/Main+Menu/Statistics/Chart+Gallery 
Figure 3: Various Economic Indicators of Turkish Economy 
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Although the Turkish lira has appreciated substantially against dollar since August 2018 (from 7.24 
on August 13 to 5.61 on August 2, 2019), Turkey’s unemployment rate surged to 14.7 in February 
2019, which is the highest level in a decade. Out of the working-age population of 32.3 million, about 
14% or 4.2 million people are unemployed; in 2017, only three million were unemployed (Figure 4). 
The biggest jump was in the youth (i.e. between 15 and 24 years old) unemployment rate, surged 
from circa 17% in 2017 to 23% in 2018 (i.e. an increase of 37 percent). As the Turkish economy had 
contracted over 3% in 2018 and further contraction is anticipated in 2019, the unemployment rate 
may be pushed over 15% in the near-term as some firms may lay off workers.     
 
 
Source: World Bank; http://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/ 
Figure 4: Unemployment Rates (2012-18) 
Unemployment rates of Turkey: 10.1% in December 2010, 8.4% in September 2011, 8.4% in September 
2012, 9.3% in September 2013, 10.5 in September 2014, 10.3 in September 2015, 11.4 in Sep 2016, 10.7 
in Sep 2017, 11.5 in Sep 2018, and 14.7 in January-February period in 2019. 
Owing to the political stability since 2002 helped by a ruling party without a coalition21, Turkish lira 
has experienced rare stability. Between July 23, 2009 and August 1, 2018; lira’s low volatility during 
this period was positively correlated with major currency pairs (see Table 4). A correlation of close 
to one indicates a positive relationship; USD/ARS (0.9738), USD/IDR (0.8874), USD/BRL (0.8825), 
USD/CAD (0.8664), USD/MYR (0.8586), USD/RUB (0.8418), USD/GBP (0.8067), USD/AUD (0.7952), 
and USD/EUR (0.7436). Table 5 illustrates the correlation between lira and other major currencies 
following the August rout; unfortunately, Turkish lira’s plummet against dollar tops the list when it is 
compared with the same currency pairs in Table 4, no statistically meaningful correlation; USD/ZAR 
(0.5745), USD/BRL (0.5553), USD/CNY (0.3941) had faced some volatility against dollar.     
                                                          
21 From 1950 to 2019, there have been four single-party governments; Democratic Party (1950-1960), Justice Party (1965-
1971), Motherland Party (1983-1991), Justice and Development Party (2002-present). There were coalition governments 
in-between; four governments (1973-1980) and seven governments during 1991-2002.   
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Table 4: Exchange Rate Correlation Before The August Rout (July 23, 2009 – August 1, 2018) 
  USD/TYR USD/EUR USD/GBP USD/CHF USD/JPY USD/CAD USD/ARS USD/BRL USD/RUB USD/CNY USD/IDR USD/MYR USD/PHP USD/SGD USD/THB USD/INR USD/ZAR 
USD/TYR 1 
                
USD/EUR 0.7436 1                
USD/GBP 0.8067 0.7556 1               
USD/CHF 0.1307 0.3153 0.3740 1              
USD/JPY 0.7009 0.7137 0.4729 0.1779 1             
USD/AUD 0.7952 0.8254 0.6818 0.4385 0.8286             
USD/CAD 0.8664 0.8712 0.7395 0.2924 0.8269 1            
USD/ARS 0.9738 0.6752 0.8037 0.1548 0.6477 0.8334 1           
USD/BRL 0.8825 0.8567 0.6666 0.1871 0.8292 0.9536 0.8441 1          
USD/RUB 0.8418 0.8768 0.6978 0.2225 0.8029 0.9657 0.8187 0.9610 1         
USD/CNY 0.1728 0.2020 0.5167 0.6526 -0.0745 0.2616 0.2242 0.0756 0.1727 1        
USD/IDR 0.8874 0.7945 0.6334 0.1380 0.9003 0.9357 0.8509 0.9541 0.9175 0.0179 1       
USD/MYR 0.8586 0.8349 0.8230 0.3780 0.7318 0.9503 0.8191 0.8939 0.9010 0.4288 0.8689 1      
USD/PHP 0.8312 0.5218 0.7540 0.4450 0.5441 0.7636 0.8489 0.6844 0.6820 0.5286 0.7045 0.8259 1     
USD/SGD 0.4309 0.5747 0.5578 0.7746 0.4886 0.6802 0.4129 0.5361 0.5923 0.7014 0.4943 0.7522 0.6946 1    
USD/THB 0.5450 0.7105 0.5253 0.4546 0.6549 0.8188 0.5140 0.7413 0.7623 0.4109 0.7272 0.8389 0.5953 0.8011 1   
USD/INR 0.8234 0.7612 0.5843 -0.0040 0.8273 0.8325 0.7846 0.9006 0.8337 -0.1876 0.9261 0.7442 0.5303 0.2835 0.6101 1  
USD/ZAR 0.8379 0.8416 0.6746 0.1372 0.8302 0.9313 0.8134 0.9540 0.9327 0.0490 0.9468 0.8751 0.6190 0.4829 0.7713 0.9295 1 
                  
Table 5: Exchange Rate Correlation After The August Rout (August 1, 2018 – July 22, 2019) 
 USD/TYR USD/EUR USD/GBP USD/CHF USD/JPY USD/CAD USD/ARS USD/BRL USD/RUB USD/CNY USD/IDR USD/MYR USD/PHP USD/SGD USD/THB USD/INR USD/ZAR 
USD/TYR 1 
                
USD/EUR -0.2012 1                
USD/GBP -0.0243 0.3166 1               
USD/CHF -0.2981 0.7357 -0.0921 1              
USD/JPY 0.1743 -0.7178 -0.3236 -0.4937 1             
USD/AUD 0.2053 0.5773 0.2800 0.2524 -0.4190             
USD/CAD -0.4098 0.5949 -0.0195 0.6715 -0.6384 1            
USD/ARS 0.1644 0.6362 0.1015 0.2692 -0.5746 0.3483 1           
USD/BRL 0.5553 -0.0837 -0.0665 -0.0255 -0.0705 0.0219 -0.1170 1          
USD/RUB -0.0951 -0.5129 -0.0465 -0.1354 0.3129 0.0716 -0.7455 0.2623 1         
USD/CNY 0.3941 -0.1751 0.3216 -0.1273 0.0187 -0.2406 -0.0320 0.0812 0.1284 1        
USD/IDR 0.3628 -0.5601 -0.1466 -0.2779 0.5093 -0.3498 -0.3665 0.0357 0.4486 0.6282 1       
USD/MYR 0.1744 0.1058 0.4201 0.0562 -0.3090 0.1226 0.2395 -0.0512 0.0768 0.7282 0.4680 1      
USD/PHP 0.3372 -0.7781 -0.4345 -0.3859 0.6133 -0.3373 -0.5782 0.2969 0.6206 0.2585 0.7350 0.0242 1     
USD/SGD 0.3511 -0.2562 0.1802 -0.0684 0.1689 -0.1922 -0.2643 0.1529 0.3960 0.7451 0.7957 0.6393 0.5276 1    
USD/THB 0.0688 -0.5216 -0.1348 -0.1162 0.3455 -0.0868 -0.6786 0.2956 0.7724 0.3752 0.7183 0.2902 0.7498 0.6560 1   
USD/INR 0.3540 -0.8128 -0.2096 -0.5662 0.6176 -0.4628 -0.6428 0.3690 0.6407 0.2122 0.6312 -0.0095 0.8321 0.4155 0.7224 1  
USD/ZAR 0.5745 -0.1015 -0.0083 -0.2518 0.1559 -0.1733 0.3455 0.2219 -0.1582 0.3177 0.4367 0.3887 0.1772 0.2647 0.0956 0.2146 1 
Source of data: Oz Forex; https://www.ofx.com/en-us/forex-news/historical-exchange-rates/ 
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3.0 Concluding Remarks 
Before the recent August rout, for analysis purpose, the Turkish economy is usually divided into two 
distinct periods; before and after the 2001 economic crisis. Except a brief period of stability (2003-
08), Turkey and its economy possess instability-inflicting imbalances; as such, high inflation, growing 
budget deficit, massive dollarization, alarming levels of external debt, and chronic current account 
deficit (i.e. a severe contraction in the economy along with lower imports reduced it since 2018). The 
2001 economic crisis was unprecedented in many aspects, but the August rout and the subsequent 
devaluation of lira as the greatest shock since 2001 left long-lasting damages; as a result, the Turkish 
economy has debilitated and found itself in an inevitable financial emergency.   
Turkey’s gloomy economic situation as well as its mounting domestic issues are not all homegrown, 
the Turkish economy’s lackluster performance is blamed on attacks of non-economic basis; as such, 
a Turkish court had convicted the U.S. pastor Andrew Brunson of terrorism charges and sentenced 
him to 38 months in prison and subsequent 25% US tariffs on steel imports; the failed coup attempt 
by a fraction of the Turkish military (July 15, 2016); widespread implications of the U.S. and China 
trade war; and rising oil prices due to the intensified U.S. sanctions on Iran and the OPEC’s decision 
to lower production of oil. Since late 2018, households and private companies have been persistent 
piling up dollar-denominated assets; economists and experts claim that this is an expected behavior 
during malignant economic times. After the 19 standby agreements with the IMF, the results clearly 
show that the IMF’s strings-attached lending has not served Turkey well. The IMF’s contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies plus intervention in exchange-rate markets contributed to instability. 
Due to the lack of financial, fiscal, and monetary discipline, privatization of the state-owned entities 
since the 1980s and capital market and trade liberalization in the 1990s have produced instability 
rather than stability, therefore the 2001, 2009 economic and currency crises and the August rout of 
2018 were inevitable; in fact, any potential crisis in the near future will also be triggered by the same 
factors that are never resolved. The biggest negative effect of capital market liberalization is that it 
has reduced the government’s ability and capacity to adequately respond to macroeconomic shocks. 
The IMF’s capital market liberalization has made Turkey more prone to economic and financial crises 
because Turkey continues to lack transparency (i.e. imperfect information) and governance.  
Turkey’s gloomy economic situation is in desperate need of foreign capital flows as Turkey’s options 
to service its debt obligations through external barrowing have become substantially limited in recent 
years. With massive foreign debt stock (about $400 billion which is over 50% of its 2018 GDP), Turkey 
must find ways to attract capital inflows in the form of FDIs and FPIs.  
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